The Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Required Income Tax Records by Meltzer, Bernard D.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1952
The Privilege against Self-Incrimination and
Required Income Tax Records
Bernard D. Meltzer
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernard D. Meltzer, "The Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Required Income Tax Records," 30 Taxes - The Tax Magazine 45
(1952).
The Privilege Against Self- Incrimination
and Required Income Tax Records
By BERNARD D. MELTZER
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School
This is an excerpt from "Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination," which appeared in the University of Chicago
Law Review (Volume 18, Number 4). The original article dealt with the debate
regarding the wisdom of the privilege, the operation of. the privilege in various
kinds of legal proceedings and the withdrawal of the privilege from records
required by law and from the records of corporations and of certain unincorpo-
rated associations. This excerpt dealing with the questions raised by revenue
:records is presented with the permission of the University of Chicago Press.
T HE RECORDS of corporations and ofunincorporated associations are not pro-
tected by the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.' The doctrines employed to reach this
result operate regardless of whether there
is a legal requirement that such records be
-kept. Accordingly, it is only where the tax-
payer is an individual or perhaps a small
unincorporated association that the applica-
bility of the privilege to taxpayers' records
-required by law raises a substantial question.
'Required Regulatory Records
The cases with the sharpest impact on
this question are not tax cases but cases
involving government regulation. Probably
the most important of these cases is Shapiro
* v. U. S.,2 involving the effect of OPA record-
keeping requirements on the privileged status
I For a review of authorities with respect
-to corporate documents, see Oklahoma Press
Publishing Company v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186,
204-209 (1946); Meltzer, "Required Records,
-the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against
,Self-Incrimination," 18 The University of
..Chicago Law Review 687, at pp. 701-704; with
respect to documents of unincorporated as-
sociations, see U. S. v. White, 322 U. S. 694
(1944); Meltzer, article cited above, at pp.
- Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
of required records. Shapiro, a licensee
under OPA food regulations, had been sus-
pected of having made tie-in sales in viola-
tion of those regulations. He was served
with a subpoena directing him to produce
certain records which OPA regulations re-
quired him to keep. At Shapiro's appearance
with those records before an OPA hearing
officer, his lawyer asked whether Shapiro
was being granted immunity "as to any and
all matters for information obtained as a
result of the investigation and examination
of these records." ' The hearing officer, more
circumspect than illuminating, replied that
"the witness is entitled to whatever im-
munity flows as a matter of law from the
production of those books and records which
are required to be kept pursuant to M. P. R.'s
271 and 426."' Shapiro, after claiming his
704-706, which discusses the possibility that
the privilege will be maintained as to the
books of "smaller" associations.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, relying on U. S. v. White, held
the documents of a trust unprivileged. See
U. S. v. Field, et al., decided October 30, 1951.
2 335 U. S. 1 (1948).
8 335 U. S., atp. 4.
4 335 U. S., at p. 4.
"constitutional privilege" and his statutory
immunity, produced the subpoenaed records.
In his trial for having made illegal tie-in
sales, his plea in bar based on a claim that
the immunity provisions of the Emergency
Price Control Act' insulated him against
prosecution was overruled. His conviction
followed and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,' and then
by a sharply divided Supreme Court.
The majority interpreted the statute as
conferring immunity only when a witness
is required to present evidence covered by
the privilege against self-incrimination. It
supported its conclusion that the records
produced by Shapiro were not privileged by
invoking the principle announced by Mr.
Justice Hughes in the Wilson case' and
reaffirmed in the Davis case:'
. . . the privilege which exists as to
private papers cannot be maintained in rela-
tion to 'records required by law to be kept
in order that there may be suitable informa-
tion of transactions which a'e the appropri-
ate subjects of governmental regulation, and
the enforcement of restrictions validly estab-
lished'."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a strong dis-
sent," argued that the Court had needlessly
reached a grave constitutional question by
adopting a "sophisticated" construction of
the immunity provision which, read literally,
conferred immunity. On the constitutional
question, which is our primary concern, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, although conceding the
validity of the record-keeping requirements,
denied that the mere requirement that rec-
ords be kept rendered the required records
unprivileged."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter challenged the
majority's reliance on the Wilson dictum,
urging that Mr. Justice Hughes had him-
'56 Stat. 23 (1942). as amended, 50 USCA
App. See. 922 (g) (1944).
6 U. S. v. Shapiro, 159 F. (2d) 890 (CCA-2,
1947).
7 Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 381-382 (1911).
' Davis v. U. S., 328 U. S. 582, 589-590 (1946).
9 335 U. S., at p. 33. A similar dictum laid
down in Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 623-624(1886), was quoted in the Shapiro case (335
U. S., at p. 33, footnote 42). While the ma-
jority opinion pointed to this dictum, Frank-
furter, J., pointed to the result in the Boyd
case (335 U. S., at pp. 67-68): An importer,
although required to present the original in-
voice to the collector in order to clear goods
for entry, was held privileged from producing
it in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding. The
apparent conflict between the result and the
language in the Boyd case may have resulted
from the double meaning of the word "re-
quired." The Invoice was "required" only as
part of an application for governmental per-
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of
the precedents may be questioned, but
there is no quarrel with his conclusions.
self limited this dictum by invoking prece-
dents which involved not merely "required"
or "quasi-public" records but truly public
records, that is, those kept by public offi-
cers in the discharge of their public duties.'
But, with deference, it is submitted that
those precedents do not support the as-
serted limitation on the scope of the Wilson
dictum. This will be clear from an examina-
tion of State v. Donovan," one of the cases
cited by Mr. Justice Hughes. In that case,
the privilege was held inapplicable to a
register of sales of intoxicating liquor kept
by a druggist pursuant to a statute pro-
viding that such records "shall be open
for the inspection of the public at all reason-
able times during business hours and any
person so desiring may make memoranda
or copies thereof."" The court stated that
the registers "are not private documents,
but are public documents, which the de-
fendant was required to keep not for his
private use but for the benefit of the pub-
lic."" Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that
"the state court construed the statute to
make the druggist a public officer and, as.
such, the custodian of the register for the
state."" This analysis is reminiscent of a
New Mexico case where the state court,
in sustaining the validity of a statute which
required the preservation for inspection of
a bovine animal's hide after it was killed,
stated that the legislature had made the
hide a public record. But surely this fic-
tional transformation of a druggist (or a
slaughterer) into an ad hoc public officer
scarcely obscures the fact that the druggist
mission to carry out a transaction. It was not
"required" in the sense that a failure to record
an executed transaction would be subject to,
penal sanctions. And it is such records which
typically constitute required records for the-
purpose of applying the self-incrimination!
clause. Indeed, the Boyd dictum seems to re-
flect this distinction.
10 Jackson, J., Murphy, J., and Rutledge, J.
also dissented. Rutledge, J., rested his dissent
on his interpretation of the applicable immunity-
provision and merely expressed doubts as t&>
the applicability of the privilege.
" 335 U. S., at pp. 53 and following.
"2335 U. S., at pp. 58 and following.
310 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709 (1901).
14North Dakota Revised Code Sec. 7596 (1899)-
15 10 N. D., at pp. 208-209, 86 N. W., at p. 711-
6 335 U. S., at p. 60.
"7State v. Walker, 34 N. M. 405, 408, 281 Pac..
481, 482 (1929).
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was an ad hoc official only because he was
required to keep the records. The same verbal
ceremony could have been used in the
Shapiro case or in any case involving the
requirement that "private" business keep
records. Moreover, in other cases cited in
the Wilson opinion, also involving liquor regu-
lation, "s there was either no attempt to char-
acterize the records as "public" " or that
characterization was merely a metaphor de-
scribing the unprivileged character of rec-
ords which were held to be "public" only
because they were required."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of
the Wilson case is unusual. That case has
uniformly been read by commentators ' as
withdrawing the privilege from records
which private citizens are by law required
to keep. Lower federal courts, relying on
the Wilson dictum, have, moreover, almost
uniformly held that records required under
a variety of regulatory statutes are un-
privileged.2 And the Supreme Court itself,
prior to the Shapiro case, had apparently
adopted a similar interpretation of the
2 Many of the state cases involved regulation
of medical prescriptions as an incident of gen-
eral prohibition statutes. See "Quasi Public
Records and Self-Incrimination," 47 Columbia
Law Review 838, 840 (1947). This fact may be
a partial explanation of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's implication that governmental access to
required records would be constitutional as to
"occupations which are malum in se, or so
closely allied thereto as to endanger the public
health, morals or safety." (335 U. S., at p. 65.)
But this rationale will surely not explain cases
such as those generally denying the privilege
to motorists required to make reports which
may be incriminating. (See Mamet, "Consti-
tutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to
Determine Alcoholic Intoxication," 36 Journal
of Criiminal Law and Criminology 132, 142 and
following (1945).) Moreover, if the privilege
is grounded in a wise social policy, it is not
entirely clear that the constitutional protection
should be narrowed in the malum-in-se area
even assuming that area could easily be fenced
off. For the community's greater need for
information in that area may well be offset
by the citizens' greater need for protection.
19 People v. Henwood, 123 Mich. 317, 82 N. W.
70 (1900). The requirement that druggists
report to prosecuting attorney liquor sales, in-
cluding illegal sales, was held valid as a "police
regulation."
20 State v. Davis, 108 Mo. 666, 671, 18 S. W.
894, 895 (1892). For a more extended discussion
of the justifications urged by state courts in
excluding required records or reports from the
privilege against self-incrimination and a col-
lection of cases, see "Quasi Public Records and
Self-Incrimination," cited at footnote 18, at
pp. 840-843.
21 See. for example, 8 Wigmore, Evidence,
Sec. 2259c (3d Ed., 1940); "Quasi Public Records
and Self-Incrimination," cited at footnote 18,
at p. 841 (1947); Davis. "The Administrative
Power of Investigation," 56 Yale Law Journal
1111, 1137, footnote 133 (1947): "The Self-
Incrimination Privilege in Actions Involving
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Wilson doctrine, 3 although it had not pre-
viously applied it squarely.
Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter's inter-
pretation of the precedents is questionable,
there can be no quarrel with his conclusion
that the required-records doctrine, where
it operates, abrogates the privilege. The
consequence of the doctrine is that Congress
by passing a statute requiring the keeping
of records may, subject to elastic limita-
tions," withdraw a constitutional privilege
from those records. This is a bizarre re-
sult in a constitutional system. The tech-
nical rationale for this inroad on the Fifth
Amendment has been an ill-defined notion
of waiver, that is, a person who carried on
activities subject to record-keeping require-
ments waives the privilege as to those rec-
ords.' But since the "waiver" is said to
result from the statutory requirement, the
waiver rationale is generally no more than
a statement that books required to be kept
are not privileged because they are required
to be kept."
Government Regulated Enterprises," 37 Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology 524 (1947).
22 See, for example, Rodgers v. U. S., 138 F.
(2d) 992, 995-996 (CCA-6, 1943) (records and
reports required by the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938): U. S. v. Sherry, 294 F. 684 (DC
Ill., 1923) (records under Harrison Act; although
the Wilson doctrine was Invoked, the court
found also that defendant had failed to object
to inspection and removal of the required
records); U. S. v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48 (DC
Miss., 1947) (records under the Fair Labor
Standards Act). But cf. Ryan v. Amazon Petro-
leum Corporation, 71 F. (2d) 1, 8 (CCA-5, 1934).
Early cases sustaining the disclosure provisions
of the Emergency Price Control Act empha-
sized the emergency character of the act. But
later cases relied squarely on the Wilson doc-
trine. See, for example, Hagen v. Porter, 156 F.
(2d) 362, 367 (CCA-9, 1946), cert. den. 329 U. S.
729 (1946); Porter v. Mueller, 156 F. (2d) 278,
281 (CCA-3, 1946).
'3 See Davis v. U. S., cited at footnote 8, at
pp. 589 and following, where the Wilson dictum
set out at page - is quoted with approval:
see also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent (at
pp. 595-596), and his dissent in Harris v. U. S.,
331 U. S. 145, 156 (1947); cf. Gouled v. U. S.,
255 U. S. 298, 308-309 (1921).
2 See footnote 28.
15 "The fundamental ground of decision in this
class of cases, is that where, by virtue of their
character and of the rules of law applicable to
them, the books and papers are held subject
to examination by the demanding authority,
the custodian has no privilege to refuse produc-
tion although their contents tend to criminate
him. In assuming their custody he has accepted
the incident obligation to permit inspection."
(Italics supplied.) Wilson v. U. S., cited at
footnote 7, at pp. 381-382.
26 See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Shapiro
v. U. S., cited at footnote 2, at p. 51. For a
discussion of the explanation of the required-
records doctrine suggested by Wigmore and
Despite the implications of the waiver
rationale, the court in the Shapiro case
recognized that there were limitations on
legislative power to abrogate the privilege
by the imposition of record-keeping require-
ments. It did not, however, indicate clearly
what these limitations are. Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Vinson, for the Court, declared:
"It may be assumed at the outset that
there are limits which the Government can-
not constitutionally exceed in requiring the
keeping of records which may be inspected
by an administrative agency and may be
used in prosecuting statutory violations
committed -by the record-keeper himself.
But no serious misgiving that those bounds
have been overstepped would appear to be
evoked when there is a sufficient relation
between the activity sought to be regulated
and the public concern so that the Govern-
ment can constitutionally regulate or forbid
the basic activity concerned, and can con-
stitutionally require the keeping of particu-
lar records, subject to inspection by the
Administrator. 27
The foregoing standard makes it easy to
pose difficult cases. Suppose, for example,
the federal government in order to enforce
the Mann Act required the keeping of rec-
ords of all interstate excursions involving
woman.' Would that requirement be valid?
One can fit the statute under the standard
announced by the Chief Justice in the
Shapiro case, but it obviously has a different
flavor from statutes requiring records as
an incident of a comprehensive regulatory
program.
It is not easy, however, to say precisely
what the difference is. Perhaps it is that
the sole or the dominant purpose of the
hypothetical record requirement appears to
be to compel criminals to keep incriminat-
ing records to be used to convict the record-
keepers in subsequent criminal trials.
Where this appears to be the dominant
purpose, a compelling argument may be
(Footnote 26 continued)
Professor Morgan. -9 M3ltzer, article cited at
footnote 1, at pp. 712-714.
21335 U. S., at p. 32.
28 The purpose of the hypothetical statute is
not obscured by the fact that some of the re-
corded transactions would be innocent. Inno-
cent transactions can always be brought under
the record-keeping requirements by draftsman-
ship which makes the category of transactions
to be recorded broad enough to include both
legal and illegal transactions.
29 See Shapiro v. U. S., cited at footnote 2,
at pp. 8 and following.
8 This preference for "personal privacy" is
suggested (1) by the cases which have with-
drawn the privilege from the books of corpo-
rations and unincorporated associations (see
made that the statutory requirement would
appear to be invalid under the Fifth Amend-
ment or, at least, ineffective to destroy the
privilege. The OPA requirements could be
said to have had an independent purpose:
facilitating the determination or modifica-
tion of price ceilings by preserving relevant
data."
There are obvious difficulties with a test
which stresses an independent purpose. It
is almost always possible to suggest some
independent purpose, for example, the need
for data bearing on the question of whether
more investigators or new laws are needed.
Furthermore, the existence of a proper pur-
pose for record keeping would not neces-
sarily justify the use of the records for an
improper purpose-self-incrimination. Fi-
nally, the criterion laid down by the Court
does not specifically exclude records whose
"sole" purpose is to furnish a diary of crime
to the prosecution.
Although it is arguable that under the
Court's language, a record-keeping require-
ment "reasonably" related to the enforce-
ment of a valid substantive regulation will
itself be valid, the Court's language is so
elastic as to suggest that a different test
may evolve. Under this test, the govern-
mental need for records to enforce a par-
ticular policy, the existence of a purpose
other than compelling documentary confes-
sions and the extent of the encroachment
on the citizen's privacy may all be weighed.
In applying the test, less weight may be
given to "business privacy" as opposed to
"personal privacy," " however difficult it
may be to draw that distinction.
Required Income Tax Records
It is surprising that the applicability of
the required-records doctrine to the record-
keeping and disclosure requirements under
the income tax laws has not been clearly
settled.' Comments written after the Shapiro
footnote 1) and (2) by the cases narrowing the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures where searches
involved business premises. See, for example
U. S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950).
a Sec. 3614 of the Internal Revenue Code
authorizes the Commissioner or his delegees,
for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
of any return or for the purpose of making a
return where none is filed, to examine relevant
books and records, and to require the attend-
ance and testimony of knowledgeable persons.
Sec. 3615 authorizes the collector In a variety
of specified situations to summon persons and
to require them to produce books and records
and to give testimony under oath, at a specified
time and place. Failure to appear and testify
or to appear and produce books in compliance
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case have suggested that the privileged char-
acter of taxpayers' records is not affected
by that decision." If by that it is meant
that a taxpayer may, on the ground that he
would be incriminated thereby, withhold
required records sought by the revenue
authorities in order to fix tax liability, the
conclusion is open to serious doubt.
It is true that several lower federal court
cases ' indicate that the taxpayer may with-
hold required records from revenue agents
seeking to determine the amount of his tax
liability. But these cases, which do not even
discuss the required-records doctrine, are of
doubtful authority for two reasons: (1) the
implications of U. S. v. Sullivan,4 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1927; (2) although
a formal distinction between regulatory and
revenue records may be made, that distinc-
tion is insubstantial in the light of the pur-
poses underlying the required-records doctrine.
In U. S. v. Sullivan, the defendant, in-
dicted for failing to file an income tax re-
turn, defended on the ground that he was
privileged to withhold it because it would
have disclosed his illegal bootlegging ac-
tivities. The Supreme Court, reversing the
Fourth Circuit Court, which had sustained
that defense, held that the privilege did not
justify the failure to make any return; the
proper course for the defendant would have
been to file a "return" and to claim his
privilege with reference to answers which
he considered protected. Although not di-
rectly passing on the proper disposition of
such a claim, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for a unanimous Court, suggested that it
might be rejected.' His cautionary lan-
guage, when read in the light of the govern-
ment's contention in the Sullivan case that
a tax return was a public record within
the meaning of the Wilson dictum,' casts
doubt on the applicability of the privilege
to income tax returns-doubts which are
equally applicable to required tax records.
If the questions left open by the Sullivan
case are resolved in the light of the pur-
poses underlying the required-records doc-
trine, it seems likely that tax records will
be given no more protection than records
required by the OPA. It is true that the
Court in the Shapiro case spoke in terms of
records required for regulatory purposes and
that this language could be seized upon as
a basis for distinguishing tax records and
excluding them from the operation of the
required-records doctrine. This distinction,
however, lacks substance. There appears to
be no reason for holding that the Constitu-
tion imposes greater restraints on disclosure
when the revenue power rather than the
regulatory power is involved. Revenue, the
backbone of enforcement, goes to the heart
of effective regulation. After having re-
moved the privilege from records required
(Footnote 31 continued)
with a summons issued by a collector under
Sec. 3615 is expressly made a crime, punishable
by fine and Imprisonment (See. 3616). On the
other hand, the Code does not specifically pro-
vide that noncompliance with a demand or sum-
mons under See. 3614 is punishable. The
Supreme Court has, however, held that an indi-
vidual who is summoned under Sec. 3614 and
refuses to answer a proper question is subject
to See. 145 (a) of the Code, which makes the
willful failure to supply any Information or to
keep any records required by the Commissioner
a crime punishable by fine and Imprisonment.
(U. S. v. Murdock, 2 us-rc ff 828, 284 U. S. 141
(1931).) The Regulations require taxpayers to
keep the books and records necessary for the
determination of their tax liability. (Regs. 111,
Sec. 29.54-1 (1949).) For a detailed discussion
of the foregoing provisions see Barnes, "Inquisi-
torial Powers of the Federal Government Re-
lating to Taxes," 28 TAXES 1211 (December,
1950).
2 Kamens and Ancier, "Immunity from Sub-
poena of Taxpayers' Records," 27 TAXES 639,
642-643 (July, 1949).
3 See, for example, Internal Revenue Agent
v. Sullivan, 287 F. 138, 140, 143 (DC N. Y.,
1923). (Taxpayer previously indicted for con-
spiracy to defraud held privileged to withhold
books from revenue agent. The pendency of
the fraud indictment may have created the
suspicion that the "tax" examination was de-
signed to circumvent the privilege in an inde-
pendent criminal proceeding.) See also Manton,
J., concurring In Steinberg v. U. S., 14 F. (2d)
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
564, 568 (CCA-2, 1926); Nicola v. U. S., 72 F.
(2d) 780. 784 (CCA-3, 1934).
84 274 U. S. 259 (1927).
"It would be an extreme if not an extrava-
gant application of the Fifth Amendment to
say that it authorized a man to refuse to state
the amount of his income because it had been
made in crime." (274 U. S., at pp. 263-264.)
This quoted statement is ambiguous. It may
mean that the connection between a statement
of the amount of one's income and a crime is
not close enough for the statement to be privi-
leged; or it may mean that income tax reports,
as such, are not privileged. The former inter-
pretation is supported by Holmes' citation of
Mason v. U. S., 244 U. S. 362 (1917), where the
Court in effect required a "direct" connection
between the anticipated answer and criminality
before recognizing a claim of privilege.
Although the Sullivan opinion dealt with
required reports to the government rather than
required records open to Inspection, no distinc-
tion has been drawn between the privileged
status of these two informatory devices. See
Rodgers v. U. S., 43-2 vsTc 5I 9664, 138 F. (2d)
992 (CCA-6, 1943); 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec.
2259c (3d Ed., 1940); Handler, "Constitutionality
of Investigation by Federal Trade Commission:
II," 28 Columbia Law Review 905, 917 (1928).
For a collection of early federal cases and
state cases dealing with the privileged status of
taxpayers' records, see Gange Lumber Company
v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 180, 53 Pac. (2d) 743
(1936), annotated in 103 A. L. R. 513 (1936).
36 274 U. S., at pp. 260-261.
as an incident of a regulatory program in
order to facilitate enforcement, it would be
paradoxical for the Court to stop short
where revenue records are involved. And
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the
Shapiro case indicates that he would not
add this paradox to the law of the privilege."
Finally, if the independent purpose test
mentioned above is recognized, considera-
tion of the purposes behind the record-
keeping requirements also leads to the
conclusion that required tax records are
unprivileged. Such records are obvious and
indispensable aids in the determination of
the amount of tax liability. Accordingly,
it can scarcely be argued that the sole or
dominating purpose of the requirements is
to force the taxpayer to keep a diary of
his own criminality for use in a prosecution
against him.
Complications are introduced when rec-
,ords required by statute for the purpose
of determining tax liability are allegedly
being examined for other purposes. Such
complications will, of course, arise when-
ever Agency A is charged with using its
informatory powers for Agency B, and the
ensuing discussion, although dealing largely
with tax records, will also illustrate the
general range of problems involved when-
,ever records are sought for purposes other
than these which produced the record-keep-
ing requirement.
Where an examination is being conducted
by revenue authorities ostensibly for reve-
nue purposes, it is doubtful that courts will
*undertake to determine whether the exami-
nation is in actuality prompted by some
.other purpose, for example, the preparation
of a criminal case against the taxpayer.
Such an inquiry raises so many practical
difficulties that it is likely that the "power"
-of the revenue agent rather than his "mo-
tive" will be decisive."
Where an agency not authorized by stat-
-ure to inspect the required records seeks
to subpoena or examine them, a different
.question is raised: whether records required
under a particular statute are unprivileged
.only in the proceedings contemplated by
the particular statute or whether the re-
.quired records are unprivileged generally.
Could the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, for example, in an investigation of
1, 335 U. S., at pp. 53-54.
3 Cf. In re International Corporation, 4 usTre
11 225, 5 F. Supp. 608, 611 (DC N. Y., 1934).
A different result might perhaps be reached
-when, as in Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan,
.cited at footnote 33, the taxpayer has been
indicted prior to inspection of his books.
39 335 U. S., at p. 54.
'o T. D. 4929. 1939-2 CB 91, Sec. 463C.33. Simi-
lar regulations provide access to returns by
market manipulation, compel the production
of incriminating records which are required
to be kept only under the revenue statutes?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting
opinion in the Shapiro case read the ma-
jority opinion as rendering records required
for one purpose unprivileged for all pur-
poses. 9 This result might follow from a
mechanical application of the "public docu-
ment" metaphor. But there are persuasive
reasons for rejecting it: Congress by re-
quiring the keeping of records to achieve
a particular purpose has indicated only that
privacy, or more bluntly, the privilege,
should yield to that purpose. It does not
follow that the privilege should yield to
other regulatory purposes.
Related problems arise where the revenue
authorities examine records for revenue pur-
poses and discover criminal violations of the
tax laws or other laws and furnish copies
or summaries of the resultant information
to the Department of Justice or to any other
interested agency. Discussion of these
problems will be facilitated by distinguish-
ing between information contained in in-
come tax returns and information contained
in records of examination of books and
papers or of witnesses.
Current Treasury Regulations ' based on
Section 55(a) of the Code endow the Secre-
tary of the Treasury with discretion to
grant the request of other federal agencies
to inspect income tax returns. These regu-
lations, moreover, explicitly provide for the
use of the resultant information as evidence
in any proceeding before a federal agency
or in any proceeding to which the United
States is a party." Finally, the regulations
provide that income tax returns may be
furnished to a United States attorney or
the Department of Justice for use in grand
jury proceedings or in court litigation in
which the United States is interested.
4
2
Where the information requested by, or
furnished to, another agency is derived by
internal revenue agents from the taxpayer's
books and records, as distinguished from
his return, different problems of statutory
authority and of policy are involved. The
Internal Revenue Code does not explicitly
regulate the furnishing of such information
to other agencies or their inspection of such
state officers and by shareholders (T. D. 4945,
1939-2 CB 97, Sees. 463D.1-463D.3). Code Sec.
55 (d) (1) authorizes inspection by committees
of Congress.
41 T. D. 4945, 1939-2 CB 97, Sec. 463D.1. The
Regulations do not deal with the admissibility
of returns in state proceedings.
42-T. D. 4945, 1939-2 CB 97, See. 463D.4.
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The cases, although not clear, appear to
sanction the interchange of information
by government agencies.
information. Accordingly, the controlling
statute would appear to be Section 22 of
Title 5 of the United States Code, which
provides as follows:
"The head of each department is author-
ized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the government of his depart-
ment, the conduct of its officers and clerks,
the distribution and performance of its busi-
ness, and the custody, use, and preserva-
tion of the records, papers, and property
appertaining to it." (Italics supplied.)
Section 22 is sufficient statutory authority
for the Treasury Regulations which author-
ize the inspection of official records con-
taining material obtained from the taxpayer's
books and records.4
Under the foregoing regulations, it is
obvious that returns filed, and books kept,
to aid in the determination of tax liability
may become the instrument of the taxpay-
er's incrimination not merely under the tax
laws but under any federal criminal statute.
The attempted use of the information in
such criminal proceeding might be met with
the argument that the taxpayer's privilege
is being circumvented: Another federal
agency (B) is securing from the collector's
office (A) information which B could not
secure directly because of lack of statutory
authority or because the books, if incrim-
inating, would be privileged. Where the
collector's office (A) has obtained infor-
mation from the taxpayer's books, it could
also be argued that permitting use of that
information by another agency (B) would
encourage B to induce A to act as its in-
vestigatory arm. Accordingly, the regula-
tions permitting such use would be
inconsistent with the limitations on both
A's and B's authority to investigate and
would be "inconsistent with law" as that
term is used in Section 22 of Title 5.
The argument based on the construction
of Section 22 will not survive analysis.
That argument requires an assumption that
what is ostensibly a tax investigation is
prompted by other motives. Absent any
evidence that the revenue authorities were
acting on behalf of another agency, the
presumption of official regularity would
operate to require the acceptance of a tax
investigation at face value. Moreover,
where a possible revenue motivation for the
investigation is present, it is probable that
the courts would give short shrift to a con-
tention that hidden motives to aid another
agency prompted an ostensible revenue in-
vestigation." The collector's investigation
would thus be valid regardless of the multi-
ple use of the resultant information, except
in the unusual situation where there was
proof that he was acting solely as the arm
of another agency. And since there is no
law against interchange of information, reg-
ulations by the Secretary of the Treasury
authorizing other agencies to use the re-
sultant information would not be "inconsist-
ent with law" and would be justified by
Section 5 of Title 22.
The argument based on the privilege is
no more persuasive. The complying tax-
payer has furnished information unpriv-
ileged at the time of its acquisition. He
is not subjected to testimonial compulsion,
or indeed to any further compulsion, when
another agency uses this information, and
the taxpayer cannot, therefore, invoke the
privilege. Congress, moreover, could in
many situations have constitutionally re-
quired the direct submission of reports to,
and the keeping of records for, the other
federal agency. There is no apparent rea-
son why Congress cannot properly authorize
federal agencies to do indirectly (through
the collector's office) what they could be
authorized to do directly (through their
own original investigations). Indeed, such
measures are desirable because they avoid
harassment of the honest citizen and useless
expenditure by the government.
The cases, although not entirely clear,
appear to sanction interchange of informa-
tion by government agencies." It is not
41 Regs. 111, Sec. 29.55(b)-1, Sec. 1.2. A gen-
eral federal statute prohibits unauthorized
disclosure of information obtained by a federal
officer in the course of his employment (18
USCA See. 1905, 62 Stat. 791 (1948)). See also
Code Sec. 4047 (a) (1). Sec. 55 (f) of the
Internal Revenue Code contains a similar pro-
hibition applicable to returns. Disclosures
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury
pursuant to Sec. 22 of Title 5 would avoid these
prohibitions.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
41 Cf. In re International Corporation, cited at
footnote 38. A different result might perhaps
be reached when, as in Internal Revenue Agent
v. Sullivan, cited at footnote 33, the taxpayer
had been indicted prior to inspection of his
books.
45 See Zap v. U. S., 328 U. S. 624, 629 (1945):
"Neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment
would preclude the agents from testifying at
the trial concerning the facts about which they
likely that these cases would be repudiated
by the Supreme Court. The Court has
sanctioned dramatically direct inroads on
the privilege, through the required-records
doctrine and otherwise." It is unlikely
that it would now strike down the shadowy
and oblique limitation involved in the sensi-
ble exchange of information by government
agencies. [The End]
WHY PRICES ARE HIGH
N O SUBJECT is so much discussedtoday-or so little understood-as in-
flation. The politicians in Washington talk
of it as if it were some horrible visitation
from without, over which they had no con-
trol-like a flood, a foreign invasion or a
plague. It is something they are always
promising to "fight"-if Congress or the
people will only give them the "weapons"
or "a strong law" to do the job.
Yet the plain truth is that our political
leaders have brought on inflation by their
own money and fiscal policies. They are
promising to fight with their right hand the
conditions they have brought on with their left.
Inflation, always and everywhere, is pri-
marily caused by an increase in the supply
of money and credit. In fact, inflation is
the increase in the supply of money and
credit. If you turn to the recent American
College Dictionary, for example, you will
find the first definition of inflation given as
follows: "Undue expansion or increase of
the currency of a country, especially by the
issuing of paper money not redeemable in
specie."
The word "inflation" originally applied
solely to the quantity of money. It meant
that the volume of money was inflated,
blown up, overextended. It is not mere
pedantry to insist that the word should be
used only in its original meaning. To use
it to mean "a rise in prices" is to deflect
attention away from the real cause of in-
flation and the real cure for it.
Let us see what happens under inflation,
and why it happens. When the supply of
money is increased, people have more money
to offer for goods. If the supply of goods
does not increase-or does not increase as
much as the supply of money-then the
prices of goods will go up. Each individual
dollar becomes less valuable because there
are more dollars. Therefore, more of them
will be offered against, say, a pair of shoes
or a hundred bushels of wheat than before.
A "price" is an exchange ratio between a
dollar and a unit of goods. When people
have more dollars, they value each dollar
less. Goods then rise in price, not because
goods are scarcer than before but because
dollars are more abundant.
In the old days, governments inflated by
clipping and debasing the coinage. Then
they found they could inflate cheaper and
faster simply by grinding out paper money
on a printing press. This is what happened
with the French assignats in 1789, and with
our own currency during the Revolution-
ary War. Today the method is a little
more indirect. Our government sells its
bonds or other IOU's to the banks. In
payment, the banks create "deposits" on
their books against which the government
can draw. A bank in turn may sell its
government IOU's to the Federal Reserve
Bank, which pays for them either by creat-
ing a deposit credit or having more Federal
Reserve notes printed and paying them out.
This is how money is manufactured.
The greater part of the "money supply"
of this country is represented not by hand-to-
hand currency but by bank deposits which
are drawn against by checks. Hence, when
most economists measure our money supply
they add demand deposits (and now usually,
also, time deposits) to currency outside of
banks to get the total. The total of money
and credit so measured was $64,099,000,000
at the end of December, 1939, and
$174,200,000,000 at the end of June this
year. This increase of 171 per cent in the
supply of money is overwhelmingly the
main reason why wholesale prices rose 135
per cent from 1939 to June of this year.-
Henry Hazlitt, Newsweek, September 3, 1951
(Foundation for Economic Education Clip-
ping of Note No. 42).
(Footnote 45 continued)
had lawfully obtained knowledge." See also
Gouled v. U. S., cited at footnote 23, at pp.
311-312; Harris v. U. S., cited at footnote 23,
at p. 154; U. S. v. Monjar, 147 F. (2d) 916, 924
(CCA-3, 1944); Shinyu Noro v. U. S., 148 F. (2d)
696 (CCA-5, 1945). But cf. Shushan v. U. S., 117
F. (2d) 110, 117-118 (CCA-5. 1941); U. S. v.
Cooper, 288 F. 604 (DC Iowa, 1923), rev'd on
other grounds, 9 F. (2d) 216 (CCA-8, 1925).
(Noncorporate books and papers obtained by
revenue agents and turned over to Department
of Justice for use In grand Jury proceedings
suppressed.)
"See Meltzer article cited at footnote 1, at
p. 688, footnote 11.
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